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Making Medical Homes Work:                   
Moving from Concept to Practice
Widespread concern about high and rising costs, coupled with increasing evidence that the quality of U.S. health care varies greatly, has put health care reform near the top of the domes-
tic policy agenda. Policy makers face mounting pressure to reform provider payment systems to spur 
changes in how providers are organized and deliver care. 
In many communities, physician practices, hospitals and other providers are poorly integrated 
in terms of culture, organization and financing. While these independent arrangements may offer 
some benefit, such as broadened patient choice, the flip side of independence is fragmentation—
across care sites, providers and in clinical decision making for patients. Current payment systems, 
particularly fee-for-service arrangements, reinforce delivery systems that offer care in silos and 
reward greater volume but not quality of care. Fee-for-service payment also provides few incentives 
for providers to invest in improving care for chronic illnesses, which account for a far greater pro-
portion of health care spending than do acute illnesses.
Among the many proposals for payment and delivery system reform under discussion, the 
medical home model has gained significant momentum in both the public and private sectors. The 
Qualifying a Physician Practice as a Medical Home
By Ann S. O'Malley, Deborah Peikes and Paul B. Ginsburg
Identifying an effective and efficient way to determine if a physician practice has the capabilities to 
serve as a medical home is a pressing challenge as public and private payers develop pilots to determine 
whether additional payment to medical homes can improve the quality and efficiency of care. Ensuring 
that a qualification tool validly captures the capabilities a practice needs to be a medical home can help 
practices focus on the most important activities to improve care. Most medical home initiatives rely on 
the joint principles of the patient-centered medical home developed by the primary care physician spe-
cialty societies, which lay out the general attributes of a patient-centered medical home. They empha-
size four key primary care elements—accessibility, continuity, coordination and comprehensiveness—
that research shows positively affect health outcomes, satisfaction and costs. An ideal qualification tool 
would ensure that medical homes are built on a firm foundation of these critical primary care pillars. A 
qualification tool that either gives insufficient emphasis to these bedrock primary care elements or gives 
too much emphasis to factors that may not be related to better performance risks excluding physician 
practices that truly function as medical homes and including those that don’t. Moreover, overly burden-
some documentation requirements for practice structures that ultimately may not improve patient out-
comes run the risk of posing a barrier to practices seeking to participate as medical homes and distract-
ing physicians from improving care for patients.
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concept has been promoted by primary care physician societies. 
And a broad range of insurers and payers—for example, United 
HealthCare, Aetna, the Blue Cross Blue Shield Association, and 
Medicaid programs—are developing medical home initiatives. 
Likewise, Congress has mandated a medical home demonstration 
in fee-for-service Medicare.
Although medical home definitions vary and continue to 
evolve, at the heart of a medical home is a physician practice com-
mitted to organizing and coordinating care based on patients’ 
needs and priorities, communicating directly with patients and 
their families, and integrating care across settings and practitio-
ners. If enough physician practices become medical homes, a criti-
cal mass might be attained to transform the care delivery system to 
provide accessible, continuous, coordinated, patient-centered care 
to high-need populations—usually considered to be patients with 
chronic illnesses. 
Some advocates ascribe a broader goal to the medical home 
model—to improve the quality of care, reduce the need for expen-
sive medical services and generate savings for payers. Medical 
homes are expected to accomplish this goal by changing how phy-
sicians practice medicine. 
Yet despite the enormous energy and resources invested in 
the medical home model to date, relatively little has been written 
about moving from theoretical concept to practical application, 
particularly on a large scale. What would an effective medical 
home program look like? And how should it be implemented? 
Forging ahead with medical home initiatives without such analyses 
to ground their design and identify potential pitfalls and solutions 
may result in ineffective programs that alienate patients and/or 
physicians. That would put at risk not only the resources invested 
by clinicians and payers/insurers in early initiatives, but also the 
political viability of the model itself in the long-term as a vehicle 
for wider health care reform.
The Center for Studying Health System Change (HSC) and 
Mathematica Policy Research (MPR) are uniquely positioned to 
address operational issues related to medical homes. Along with 
conducting independent and collaborative research relevant to 
medical homes, care coordination, payment policy and the orga-
nization of care delivery, HSC and MPR researchers have direct 
experience with both public- and private-sector medical home 
initiatives, including leading the design of the Medicare medical 
home demonstration.
Based on these experiences, we’ve identified four critical opera-
tional issues in the implementation of most medical home models 
that we believe have potential to make or break a successful pro-
gram: (1) how to qualify physician practices as medical homes; (2) 
how to match patients to their medical homes; (3) how to engage 
patients and other providers to work with medical homes in care 
coordination; and (4) how to pay practices that serve as medical 
homes. Drawing on published data and our on-the-ground exper-
tise, we hope that these analyses will guide clinicians, payers and 
policy makers as they attempt to build a solid foundation for suc-
cessful medical home initiatives. Doing so will improve the chanc-
es that the medical home concept can serve as a stepping stone to 
broader reforms in health care payment and delivery systems.
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Building Medical Homes on a Solid      
Primary Care Foundation
Public and private payers are launching patient-centered medi-cal home (PCMH) experiments as one strategy to improve 
the quality and coordination of care, potentially lower costs, and 
increase financial support to primary care physicians. These experi-
ments seek to test a medical home concept that emphasizes the 
central importance of primary care to an organized and patient-
centered health care system.1-3 The medical home concept posits 
that primary care physicians’ direct and trusted relationship with 
patients, coupled with a depth and breadth of clinical training 
across body systems, position them to assess an individual’s health 
needs and to tailor a comprehensive approach to care across condi-
tions, care settings and providers.
Not all primary care practices are set up to function as a 
PCMH. In part, this shortcoming results from inadequate financial 
support for such activities as care coordination, along with inad-
equate training of providers on how to work together as a team. In 
an attempt to remedy this, payers are experimenting with provid-
ing additional payment to participating practices that can dem-
onstrate the capabilities of a patient-centered medical home. Most 
current pilots and demonstrations require practices to “qualify” 
as a medical home via an objective measurement tool. The tool’s 
measures, in effect, are a blueprint for practices’ efforts to build 
medical-home capabilities.
Primary Care and Chronic Care Models
While there are different views about what makes a physician prac-
tice a medical home, the specialty societies’ joint principles are the 
widely accepted starting point for most current demonstrations 
and pilots.4 The joint principles originate from two distinct con-
ceptual frameworks, the primary care model1, 2, 5 and the chronic 
care model,6 each of which was developed for different purposes. 
The primary care model1, 2, 5 focuses on all patients in a practice 
and emphasizes whole-person care over time, rather than single-
disease-oriented care. The primary care model identifies four 
elements as essential to the delivery of high-quality primary care: 
accessible first contact care, or serving as the entry point to the 
health care system for the majority of a person’s problems; a con-
tinuous relationship with patients over time; comprehensive care 
that meets or arranges for most of a patient’s health care needs; and 
coordination of care across a patient’s conditions, providers and 
settings in consultation with the patient and family.1, 2, 5 
The chronic care model focuses on “system changes intended to 
guide quality improvement and disease management activities” for 
chronic illness.6 The chronic care model includes six interrelated 
elements—patient self-management support, clinical information 
systems, delivery system redesign, decision support, health care 
organization and community resources. Three aspects of the model 
in particular—self-management support, delivery system design 
and decision support—used in combination have improved single 
chronic condition care, in particular for diabetes.6-8 The designers 
of the chronic care model assumed that before implementation 
“every chronically ill person has a primary care team that orga-
nizes and coordinates their care.”6 In other words, the chronic care 
model is meant to be developed on a “solid platform of primary 
care.” 6, 9, 10 Consequently,  both the primary care and chronic care 
models suggest that a medical home qualification tool must first 
capture and measure the four defining primary care elements 
before emphasizing capabilities to treat individual chronic diseases.
Recognizing the benefits and evidence behind each of the key 
primary care elements—accessibility, continuity, coordination and 
comprehensiveness—on patient and population health outcomes, 
patient and provider satisfaction, and costs, the joint principles 
require the medical home to provide each.2, 5, 11-18 To the four pri-
mary care elements, the physician societies added aspects of the 
chronic care model—team functioning in a physician-directed 
practice, quality and safety tools for evidence-based medicine, 
decision support, performance measurement, quality improve-
ment, enlisting patient feedback and “appropriate” use of informa-
tion technology.4 
Common attributes across the primary care and chronic care 
models can inform selection of the most relevant measures for a 
patient-centered medical home qualification tool (see Table 1 for 
a summary of elements of the two care models as they align with 
the physician societies’ joint principles). In sum, these concep-
tual frameworks and the evidence supporting them suggest that 
a tool to determine whether a practice is a medical home would 
ideally measure that a practice has in place processes to ensure 
that care is accessible, continuous, coordinated and comprehen-
sive. Capabilities that could help support these elements include 
a searchable patient registry, a mutual agreement between the 
patient and the medical home team on their respective roles and 
expectations, tools for comprehensive care such as planned visits 
that include pre- and post-visit planning, the use of care plans 
when appropriate, and enhanced access via phone and same-day 
appointment availability. Lastly, because of the time and resource 
constraints under which primary care practices already operate, it 
is particularly important that the qualification tool not create an 
onerous documentation burden for participating practices. 
Qualifying Physician Practices, continued from p. 1
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Table 1
Commonalities Between the Physician Societies’ Joint Principles, the Primary Care Model and the Chronic Care 
Model that Can Guide Measurement of the Patient-Centered Medical Home (PCMH)
PCMH Elements as Outlined by the Physician Societies’ Joint 
Principles4
Capabilities related to this PCMH Element from the Joint 
Principles, the Primary Care Model & Chronic Care Model 
Accessibility of the practice
PCMH is an accessible point of entry into the health care system 
each time new care is needed (i.e. first contact care).
• Open scheduling.4, 19-21
• Ease of making appointments and wait times.2 
• Expanded hours.2, 4
• Options for patients to communicate with  personal physician 
and office staff.4
• 24-7 phone coverage.2, 4 
Continuity of care
“Each patient has an ongoing relationship with a personal physician 
in the PCMH.”
Person-focused (not just disease specific) care over time.
• Each patient has an identifiable primary care clinician for 
ongoing care.2, 4, 5, 13 
• Patient is able to make appointments with that particular cli-
nician.2, 5, 13 
• Discussion about PCMH role and expectations with the 
patient—Discussion between personal physician and patient 
on the roles and expectations for the medical home, including 
making visible to the patient who the team members are.2, 21, 22  
• Registry of patients.2, 4, 6 PCMH has a list of patients for which 
it is responsible.
• Complete medical records are retrievable and accessible.2
Coordination of care “across all domains of the health care system.” • PCMH coordinates care that patients receive from other 
providers (e.g. specialists, hospitals, home health agencies to 
assure that patients get the indicated care when and where 
they need and want it, including medication review and man-
agement.2, 5, 14, 23 
• Referral tracking and follow up.2 
• Evidence-based decision making around referrals.5, 24
Comprehensiveness 
PCMH recognizes and provides, or arranges for “care for all stages of 
life, including: acute care, chronic care, preventive services and end-
of-life care.”
• Planned visits.6, 25, 26  
• Registry of patients2, 4, 6 facilitates comprehensive care and pop-
ulation health management by enabling searches of patients 
with particular conditions and characteristics.2, 6  
• Range of services offered by PCMH.2, 5
Physician directed medical practice with a team that “takes collec-
tive responsibility for ongoing care of patients.”
• A team approach can, in theory, leverage the relative clinical 
and organizational training skills of each member (e.g. physi-
cian, nurse, medical assistant) to ensure that the increasingly 
complex and inter-related needs of patients with multiple 
chronic conditions are met. Teamwork can facilitate compre-
hensiveness and coordination of care.2, 6, 27
Quality & Safety • Decision making guided by evidence-based medicine and 
decision-support tools.6
• Quality improvement efforts.4, 6 
• Patients participate in decision making.4, 6 
• Patient feedback is sought to ensure expectations are met.4, 6 
Information Technology
“Uses IT appropriately to support optimal patient care, performance 
measurement, patient education and enhanced communication.”
• Registry of patients.2, 4, 6 Consensus statement focused on 
aspects of information systems most relevant to the immedi-
ate progress of the PCMH emphasizes the use of a registry to 
identify the PCMH’s patients, facilitate disease management, 
population health and evidence-based care.28 
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Current Qualification Tool 
Most medical home demonstrations and pilots are measuring 
whether a practice is a medical home via the National Committee 
for Quality Assurance (NCQA) Physician Practice Connections-
Patient Centered Medical Home tool (PPC-PCMH version 2008).29  
The PPC-PCMH is a modification of an earlier NCQA tool, the 
PPC (Physician Practice Connections) that focused on recognizing 
practices that use systematic processes and information technol-
ogy to enhance the quality of care.29 The PPC and the PPC-PCMH 
are based on the chronic care model6 and have less emphasis on 
the primary care model’s four elements. While it is difficult to suc-
cinctly describe the PPC-PCMH or its scoring algorithm, the tool 
has nine standards: 
•	 Access and Communication; 
•	 Patient Tracking and Registry Functions; 
•	 Care Management; 
•	 Patient Self-Management Support; 
•	 Electronic Prescribing; 
•	 Test Tracking; 
•	 Referral Tracking; 
•	 Performance Reporting and Improvement; and
•	 Advanced Electronic Communication. 
Embedded within the tool’s nine standards are 30 elements 
containing a total of 166 items, or measures (see Table 2 for a sum-
mary of the measures and the capabilities captured). Depending on 
the score achieved, the PPC-PCMH can qualify a practice at one 
of three levels of medical-home capabilities (basic, intermediate, 
advanced). So, for example, at Level 1, a practice must pass five of 
10 “must-pass” elements. Practices seeking PPC-PCMH recogni-
tion complete the Web-based tool and provide documentation to 
validate responses.29
How the Tool Performs in Measuring    
Medical-Home Capabilities
The PPC-PCMH tool has notable strengths, first of which is its 
support from payers, specialty societies and the National Quality 
Forum. The tool allows for flexibility in how practices meet some 
of the requirements. This is important because procedures for 
achieving particular capabilities will likely vary with practice cul-
ture, resources and patient-panel characteristics. In addition, the 
NCQA tool requires supporting documentation from practices 
for those capabilities where validation appears to be necessary to 
ensure their presence.2, 30 NCQA’s experience and infrastructure for 
fielding and scoring quality measures also are strengths. Thus, the 
tool is a good start for developing consistent measurement across 
medical home initiatives.
However, the current PPC-PCMH may not be ideal for ascer-
taining medical-home capabilities because it underemphasizes 
some of the defining primary care elements and overemphasizes 
issues not specific to a medical home. The tool has a fairly strong 
emphasis on access and some aspects of coordination, such as 
referral tracking, but other important aspects of coordination (e.g. 
between the primary care physician and specialists) are not part of 
the 2008 version that most pilots plan to use. The tool has only two 
items on continuity of care and few items on comprehensiveness. 
Many of the measures in the PPC-PCMH focus not on primary 
care, but on such issues as information technology or condition-
specific performance reporting. So a practice could potentially 
score well on the PPC-PCMH without providing patient-centered 
primary care. 
First, the tool places great weight on information technology 
(IT) capabilities—77 of the 166 measures relate to IT. Information 
technology clearly has potential to make clinical data available to 
providers in real time, when it is needed for shared decision mak-
ing with patients. When an affordable, interoperable electronic 
medical record (EMR) eventually becomes a reality, it will likely be 
an enormous advance in information continuity across care set-
tings and, thus, potentially foster care coordination.
In the meantime, however, it may be premature to require prac-
tices to have more than a searchable patient registry. Many primary 
care physicians, particularly those in small practices that make up 
the bulk of the U.S. primary care infrastructure,31 lack the econo-
mies of scale that facilitate purchasing and maintaining an EMR 
and do not want to do so until an affordable and interoperable 
option is widely available. Moreover, the evidence of commercial 
EMRs’ effectiveness in primary care practices is mixed. To date, the 
vast majority of effectiveness studies come from four large insti-
tutions with internally developed EMRs.32, 33 Most of the positive 
outcomes from outpatient studies involve the use of computer-gen-
erated, paper-based reminders or registries.32-34 The presence of an 
EMR correlates only weakly with clinical quality of care measures. 
Nevertheless, practices with fully functional EMRs scored the high-
est on the PPC.35 
Two other IT capabilities that are heavily emphasized in the 
PPC-PCMH, but for which the evidence is mixed, include e-mail 
communication with patients 36, 37 and e-prescribing.32, 33, 38, 39 Research 
on e-mail’s effectiveness in patient care is still in its infancy. As of 
2006, only 3 percent of physicians used e-mail frequently to com-
municate with patients.37 While there is momentum in federal 
policy behind e-prescribing, improved outcomes from e-prescrib-
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ing have predominantly been demonstrated with computerized 
physician order entry (CPOE) in the hospital setting. In the pri-
mary care setting, results have been more mixed.32, 33, 38-40 The PPC-
PCMH’s heavy IT emphasis raises the concern that practices with 
IT structures may score well without necessarily providing better 
clinical outcomes or continuous and coordinated care. The large 
number of IT measures in the NCQA tool could also create bar-
riers to qualification among practices that provide good primary 
care but don’t necessarily emphasize IT.  
Second, the tool requires extensive documentation around 
single-condition care. The goal of this requirement was to pro-
vide practices with the motivation to consider how a systematic 
approach to work flow and documentation could promote broader 
changes within a practice. This incremental approach could help 
practices to systematically address particular chronic conditions 
and important population-based health issues. The tool allows 
Table 2
Frequency of Items from the PPC-PCMH Organized by Concept Captured
Percentage* Number of Items Capability**
46 77 Information Technology
• 19 items on e-prescribing
• 18 items on electronic data system for patient demographic data
• 14 items on the use of e-mail, e-communication, or interactive Web site 
• 11 items on electronic system for basic clinical data 
• 8 items on electronic system for managing tests 
• 7 items on electronic system for population management
14 24 Care for three specific conditions that the practice identifies as important to their patient 
panel, e.g. including identifying those patients, use of condition-specific guidelines, care 
management and self-management support.
13 21 Coordination of care 
• 1 item on scheduling visits to different providers into one trip for the patient 
• 4 items on referral-tracking 
• 6 items on test tracking and follow up 
• 10 items assess information continuity across settings, e.g. care transitions
9 15 Accessibility
5 8 Performance reporting
4 7 Organizing clinical data via tools such as problem lists and medication lists
2 4 Use of non-physician staff (an important element of team work)
2 4 Does the practice collect data on patient experience with care 
• 1 item on access to care 
• 1 item on physician communication 
• 1 item on patient confidence in self-care 
• 1 item on satisfaction with care
1 2 Preventive services  
1 2 Continuity of care with a personal clinician
1 2 Patient communication preferences
* Percentage of the toal of 166 items.
** These item counts have been organized by content area rather than by their labels in the PPC-PCMH.
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practices the flexibility to identify what those important condi-
tions are for its patient panel. A caution, however, is that among 
Americans 65 and older, almost two-thirds have multiple chronic 
conditions.41, 42 Given this, there is a risk that a measurement 
approach that overemphasizes adherence to condition-specific 
guidelines could create incentives to simply treat a patient’s indi-
vidual condition to achieve benchmarks rather than to provide 
comprehensive and coordinated care across a patient’s complex 
health needs.43 
Illustrating these risks, a high score on the current PPC-PCMH 
tool does not guarantee that a practice actually functions as a med-
ical home. One study in predominantly large groups in Minnesota 
found that particular components (e.g. decision support, clinical 
information system) of the PPC, a forerunner to the PPC-PCMH 
were correlated with performance in diabetes care (HgA1c <=8%, 
LDL <130 mg/dL).44 At the same time, performance on the tool 
does not appear to correlate with patient experiences with care.35  
Thus, while the tool has promise in terms of capturing important 
elements of diabetes care, a medical home qualification tool should 
better identify whether patients are experiencing care that is truly 
patient-centered. 
The time required to qualify via the PPC-PCMH tool, both 
in terms of developing processes to meet the tool’s measures and 
completion of the application itself, may be a barrier to partici-
pation among smaller practices that have fewer resources. After 
completing a shorter online screening tool that provides practices 
with an opportunity to estimate where they might fall in relation 
to the tool’s criteria, the practice can decide whether to move for-
ward with the actual PPC-PCMH. Only anecdotal information is 
available to date on the 2008 version of the PPC-PCMH. Based 
on information from the older version, NCQA estimates that the 
newer PPC-PCMH tool and its documentation take a practice 
on average between 40 and 80 hours to complete. This does not 
include time a practice spends developing new processes to address 
certain capabilities measured by the tool. Several practices report 
that the older PPC (2004-05) application was time-consuming, 
taking 80 to 100 hours to complete.45 Given that practices with five 
or fewer physicians constitute 95 percent of office-based medical 
practices,31 such time and resource considerations could pose sig-
nificant barriers to participation among the very practices medical 
home initiatives are targeting. 
Next Steps 
One approach to modifying the PPC-PCMH tool would be to 
focus initially on measures that capture the key primary care ele-
ments, are supported by evidence, and that experience suggests are 
feasible or have the strongest face validity with practitioners and 
If certain measures require a good deal of time and 
documentation from a practice, then there should 
be strong evidence that they lead to improved 
patient outcomes.
patients. If certain measures require a good deal of time and docu-
mentation from a practice, then there should be strong evidence 
that they lead to improved patient outcomes.
The burden on practices to complete the PPC-PCMH docu-
mentation could be reduced by decreasing the number of IT items, 
particularly those with inconclusive data on effectiveness. Practices 
that have an EMR should get credit for their efforts, but this can 
be ascertained with fewer IT measures. Existing data do support 
keeping a measure of whether a practice has an electronic patient 
registry, including a list of patients for whom a practice serves as 
a medical home and that can be used to identify patients needing 
preventive services and chronic condition management.2, 6, 28  
At this point, the PPC-PCMH might be viewed as a starting 
point for developing a future tool that more comprehensively cap-
tures the four primary care elements. Validated measures for these 
primary care elements exist,46, 47 and selected domains from validat-
ed provider surveys could be incorporated into the PPC-PCMH.46 
For example, in addition to the tool’s two current measures of con-
tinuity of care—scheduling each patient with a personal clinician 
and visits with the assigned personal clinician—validated items on 
continuity could be added, such as how long on average patients 
stay with the practice and what percentage of patients use the prac-
tice for most of their non-emergency sick and well care needs. 
The tool could include measures on processes to improve com-
munication between the medical home and specialists related to 
referrals and consultations. With respect to comprehensiveness, a 
practice could check off services provided,  ranging from preven-
tive, acute and chronic care to basic procedures that can be done in 
the office setting with a focus on those known to be cost-effective 
and of sufficient need in the population, such as immunizations, 
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family planning and pulmonary function tests.2 
Validation that the medical home is indeed patient-centered 
could be enhanced by the inclusion of patient feedback in a qualifi-
cation tool. While most demonstrations and pilots will delay enlist-
ing patient feedback until the evaluation phase (rather than doing 
so in the qualification phase), confirmation of the presence of 
particular PCMH elements during the qualification phase could be 
assisted by incorporating patient input using validated measures.46, 47 
Recognizing many of these concerns, the physician specialty 
societies endorsed the PPC-PCMH for testing purposes only. 
NCQA is working to incorporate stakeholder input into future 
versions of the tool, including measures of coordination between 
the primary care physician and specialists and an important mea-
sure on mutual acknowledgement of the partnership between the 
patient and the medical home. Unfortunately, these revisions are 
not likely to be incorporated in time for the tool that will be used 
in the qualification phase of most pilots. The reality of current 
medical home initiatives is that payers want to see documenta-
tion of improved capabilities from providers if they are going to 
increase reimbursement for medical home services. In an effort to 
be responsive to that request, the medical home qualification tool 
train has, perhaps, prematurely left the station. 
Past experience with performance measurement linked to pay-
ment suggests that “we will get what we measure.” Both the pri-
mary care and chronic care models suggest that the qualification 
of practices as medical homes should be based on the conceptual 
underpinnings of primary care. Measures in a medical home quali-
fication tool, therefore, should capture the structures and processes 
that ensure accessibility, continuity, coordination and comprehen-
siveness. Additional capabilities that could help deliver these ele-
ments and enhance chronic care provision include a patient regis-
try, mutual acknowledgement between the patient and the medical 
home physician on their respective roles and expectations, 24-7 
phone access, some same-day appointments, team-based care, and 
the use of planned care visits.
At this critical turning point for the nation’s fragile and under-
funded primary care infrastructure, a medical home qualification 
tool that insufficiently emphasizes key primary care elements risks 
excluding physician practices that actually deliver patient-centered 
primary care as medical homes and including those that don’t. 
Moreover, an overly burdensome tool with large documentation 
requirements for structures that ultimately may not be associ-
ated with improved clinical outcomes runs the risk of distracting 
physicians from developing the practice capabilities that can truly 
improve patient care.
For medical homes to achieve their potential to improve care, pay-
ers must link each eligible patient to a medical home practice in a 
way that ensures transparency, clinical face validity and fairness for 
physicians. Equally important are adequate choice and awareness 
of the medical home model for patients and operational feasibil-
ity for payers that must determine which physician practices are 
eligible for enhanced payments. The approach the payer uses to 
assign, or attribute, patients to medical homes will ultimately influ-
ence how successfully medical home initiatives can engage patients 
and physicians.
Matching Patients to Medical Homes: 
Ensuring Patient and Physician Choice
By Deborah Peikes, Hoangmai H. Pham, Ann S. O'Malley   
and Myles Maxfield
Why Patient Assignment Matters, 
Or It Takes Three to Tango
Physician practices acting as medical homes need to know which patients they are responsible for so the practices can 
coordinate those patients’ care. If physicians can clearly identify 
the patients they are responsible for, they can more accurately pre-
dict the additional revenue they can expect for acting as a medical 
home. More accurate revenue prediction in turn allows practices 
to make informed decisions about whether they want to become a 
medical home and what additional staff or infrastructure, such as 
information technology, they can afford to purchase. Finally, giving 
physicians some choice about which patients they will form medi-
cal home relationships with rather than having this dictated by a 
payer will enhance physician buy in. 
Patients need to know which practice serves as their medical 
home so they know who to count on to coordinate and manage 
their overall care. In addition, patients need to be aware of what 
the medical home will provide if they are to work closely with 
the medical home and change the way they use care. To be sure, 
a patient can garner some benefit from practice transformations 
resulting from their physician’s practice becoming a medical 
home—such as ensuring that abnormal lab results are tracked—
without knowing about the medical home model. Ideally, how-
ever, the medical home will help patients decide when to see a 
specialist, select a specialist that will both serve the patient’s clini-
cal needs and coordinate with the medical home physician, and 
achieve smooth transitions after a hospital discharge. 
The current fee-for-service payment system lacks incentives 
for primary care physicians to consistently play an active role in 
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integrating and coordinating care. Without a conversation explain-
ing the new medical home model of care, many patients will con-
tinue to use care outside of the medical home without telling their 
medical home physician. If physicians are unaware of patients’ self-
referrals to specialists, or emergency room and hospital use, they 
cannot help patients coordinate their care. Similarly, if medical 
homes provide expanded access, this should also be explained to 
patients so they do not simply use the emergency room or seek out 
another primary care physician for problems that can be addressed 
in the medical home practice. 
Evidence suggests that educating patients about the roles 
and responsibilities of both the medical home physician and the 
patient can help patients transform the way they use care. Indeed, 
the British Columbia Primary Care Demonstration found that 
patients’ use of specialty, emergency room and primary care deliv-
ered by other physicians declined only after the program changed 
the registration process to require that physicians educate patients 
about the benefits of continuity of care with the primary care phy-
sician, as well as providing extended hours. 
The final reason patients should be informed of the medical 
home is to address potential privacy concerns. If patients are 
not informed, they may be alarmed to find out that payers are 
sharing confidential information with the medical home physi-
cian about their use of emergency room, hospital and specialist 
care.
Payers, typically insurers, need to link patients to specific 
physicians for three reasons. First, since most insurers in part use 
capitated payments, or per-patient, per-month fees, to compensate 
physicians for providing medical home services, insurers need to 
know which patients belong to which physicians so that payment 
goes to the correct physicians. Second, some insurers provide 
feedback data on quality and utilization for individual patients or 
the entire patient panel to physicians as part of their medical home 
initiatives. Finally, insurers need to know which patients belong 
with which physicians when they evaluate the effectiveness of the 
medical home.
Payers can link patients to physicians using four general 
approaches: 
•	 apply claims-based algorithms;
•	 ask physicians to identify patients;
•	 ask patients to identify physicians; or 
•	 employ hybrids of these three approaches. 
Each of the approaches has different strengths and weaknesses 
on six important dimensions: patient choice, physician choice, ease 
Patients need to know which practice serves as 
their medical home so they know who to count 
on to coordinate and manage their overall care. 
In addition, patients need to be aware of what 
the medical home will provide if they are to work 
closely with the medical home and change the 
way they use care. 
for physician, ease for insurer, correct assignments and encourag-
ing patient understanding of medical home rights and responsi-
bilities (see Table 3). 
Claims-Only Approach Common                
but Prone to Errors
The most commonly used approach to linking patients to phy-
sicians in commercial insurers’ medical home pilots relies on 
claims-based algorithms. Such algorithms typically search histori-
cal claims for the physician billing for the most recent claims with 
an evaluation and management (E&M) code or pharmacy claim, 
or the largest share of E&M visits for the patient.48 Claims-based 
approaches are expeditious because the insurer avoids the costs of 
collecting information from patients and physicians.
An approach that relies exclusively on claims is operationally 
easy for both insurers, who simply review historical claims data, 
and physicians, who do not participate in any way. However, by 
excluding physician and patient input, this approach does not 
allow either to select the person with whom they perceive they 
have a medical home relationship. Moreover, automatic assign-
ment may interfere with existing patient-physician relationships 
and risk alienating both parties. Even if claims could get the 
assignment correct, the success of the medical home intervention 
depends on educating patients about the new services medical 
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homes are providing and how to use care in a way that facilitates 
efficiency and coordination. Without involving patients, this 
opportunity is lost. 
 Perhaps most importantly, while the efficiency of using his-
torical claims data is tempting from an operational perspective, 
claims can be inaccurate and may not reflect clinical realities. 
Because many patients see multiple physicians, claims algorithms 
cannot always indentify the correct provider. For example, in a 
given year, Medicare beneficiaries see a median of two primary 
care providers and five specialists working in four different prac-
tices.49 The Medicare Health Support (MHS) study examined 
how often a group of physicians identified via a claims algorithm 
actually included the patient’s self-reported primary physician for 
heart disease. While the algorithm identified on average five doc-
tors per beneficiary that might be the personal physician, it failed 
to include the primary physician as identified by 17 percent of 
patients.50 
Another illustration of the inaccuracy of claims-based algo-
rithms comes from the seeming instability of care relationships 
suggested by claims data, which may not be consistent with patient 
self-reports. The Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey indicates 
that patients’ care relationships are more stable than the claims-
based algorithm would suggest, as 70 percent of beneficiaries 
reported having the same physician as their usual provider for at 
least three years; the analogous figure would be less than 40 per-
cent based on claims assignment.49
Anecdotal evidence suggests patients with other types of insur-
ance also see multiple primary care practices. For example, one 
state Medicaid program found that half of all patients whose claims 
suggested they saw a large primary care practice as their medical 
home—they had one or more well-child visits or two or more sick 
visits with the practice in the prior year—also had visits with other 
nearby practices. United Healthcare’s analysis of claims data con-
vinced the company to supplement claims information with patient 
and physician input. The analysis used the prior 18 months of 
claims to identify the likely medical home practice of commercially 
insured patients aged 18 to 64. A year later, claims data suggested 
that 72 percent of the patients with a medical home the year before 
who still had coverage with United had the same medical home 
practice, 16 percent had moved to another practice, and 12 percent 
did not use a primary care practice.51 Claims data alone cannot 
answer whether these patients truly changed the practice they con-
sider to be their medical home. 
Another problem with most current claims-based approaches 
is that they do not address patients who lack a primary care physi-
cian, or the “medically homeless.” One study found that in a one-
year period, 15 percent of all Medicare beneficiaries saw only spe-
cialists without seeing any primary care doctors, and 6 percent had 
no E&M visits with any type of doctor.49 Another study reported 
that more than one-third of working-age adults did not have an 
accessible primary care provider, and half of children did not have 
a medical home.52 Approaches based purely on claims would not be 
able to assign these patients. 
Physicians May Be Unaware of Other Providers
An approach that asks physicians to identify which patients to 
assign to their practice still requires insurers to reconcile each 
physician’s patient list to ensure the patients are eligible for cov-
erage and have not been identified by another physician. While 
physicians would have input into which patients they would like 
to serve, in many cases, they may not be aware of other physicians 
that their patients see. 
Table 3
Trade-Offs of Different Medical Home Assignment Procedures
Claims-Based 
Algorithms
Physician Reports Patient Reports Hybrid (Claims, 
Physicians, Patients)
Ensures Patient Choice No No Yes Yes
Ensures Physician Choice No Yes No Yes
Operationally Easy for Physician Yes No Yes No
Operationally Easy for Payer Yes No No No
Correct Assignments Not Always Not Always Not Always Yes
Encourages Patient Understanding of Medical 
Home Rights and Responsibilities No No Yes Yes
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Thus, an approach that relies on physician input without patient 
input may not always generate correct assignments. And like 
claims-only approaches, physician-driven approaches would not 
assist patients in receiving adequate information about the new 
medical home services.
Patient Reports Operationally Challenging
Turning to a patient-focused approach, where patients would be 
asked to submit the name of their medical home, the burden on 
insurers to collect this information from patients would be high. 
People don’t always turn in their forms. For example, often only 
one-third to one-half of people respond to social science surveys 
without substantial effort to collect their responses. Even when 
money is at stake, not all people file the necessary forms. Only 80 
percent to 86 percent of tax filers eligible for the earned income tax 
credit actually claim the credit.53  
The patient-based approach has three strengths. First, there 
is no operational burden on physicians. Second, the assignments 
will be correct from the patient perspective. Third, because insur-
ers will need to inform patients about the medical home concept 
when their input is solicited, insurers likely would inform patients 
of their medical home rights and responsibilities. However, the 
physician’s perception of who their core patients are may vary from 
the patient’s perspective.
A Hybrid Approach Can Help Build          
Medical Home Relationships
A hybrid approach that combines features of the claims-based, 
physician-driven and patient-driven approaches would best help 
build medical home relationships while honoring existing patient-
physician relationships. For example, insurers could send practices 
a list of their potential patients (e.g., those who claims indicate they 
saw the physician one or more times in the prior two years). The 
physicians would then be expected to obtain the patient’s consent 
to be matched to their practice, and the physician could explain 
medical home features to the patients. This approach also ensures 
that patients can decline if they prefer another medical home. 
Insurers could send patients who had not seen a physician in 
the prior two years a list of medical homes in their area that are 
accepting new patients and ask patients to select one, or opt in. 
While insurers might not wish to simply assign patients to a prac-
tice and give them the opportunity to change that assignment—an 
opt-out approach—there may be a role for such an approach for 
patients who do not voluntarily select a medical home. The insurer 
could assign those patients to a practice and notify both the 
practice and patient of the assignment and the patient’s ability to 
A hybrid approach that combines features of 
the claims-based, physician-driven and patient-
driven approaches would best help build medi-
cal home relationships while honoring existing 
patient-physician relationships. 
change to another medical home if desired. Seeking patient input, 
and only assigning patients if they do not provide it, decreases the 
burden for the insurer, while still maximizing patient and physi-
cian choice. 
The insurer could also require a formal, bilateral acknowledg-
ment between the medical home physician and the patient that 
explains the respective roles of the medical home and the patient. 
Patients would retain the right to change their medical home if 
they are not satisfied with their care.
Accurate Assignment Matters
Accurate and meaningful linkages between the patient and the 
medical home physician are critical and require the input of physi-
cians and patients. Having a process in place that requires patients 
to participate actively is pivotal to the potential of medical homes 
to transform patterns of care. 
An approach that balances the needs and preferences of 
patients, physician practices and payers carries four benefits. First, 
such an approach helps obtain patient buy in to understand and 
use new medical home services effectively. Second, physicians will 
have clear responsibility for individual patients and be better able 
to coordinate care for those patients. Third, insurers can direct 
payment and provide information on service use and prevention 
or treatment needs to each physician for the appropriate patients. 
Finally, the most accurate approaches to assignment will facilitate 
rigorous evaluations of the medical home model.
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Medical Homes:                         
The Information Exchange Challenge
By Myles Maxfield, Hoangmai H. Pham                       
and Deborah Peikes
The potential of medical homes to improve quality and reduce 
costs by improving coordination of care across providers, 
care settings and clinical conditions will be limited without 
effective mechanisms for exchanging clinical information 
with patients and providers outside of the medical home. An 
explicit agreement between the medical home and the patient 
detailing the roles and responsibilities of both could assist with 
the exchange of information. Exchanging information with 
specialists may not be feasible without some form of electronic 
exchange or incentives for specialists to participate.
Closing the Circuit Among Medical Homes, 
Patients and Other Providers
Medical home initiatives typically have two overarching goals—to reduce costs and improve the quality of care. 
Medical homes are expected to reduce costs directly by avoiding 
redundant or unneeded tests, imaging, procedures and medications, 
hereafter generically called unnecessary services. These reductions 
are expected to be large enough to offset any increased spending 
on medical home services. By maintaining comprehensive clini-
cal information on patients, medical homes can avoid unnecessary 
services in three ways: 1) using  the results of tests, imaging and ser-
vices ordered by other providers; 2) advising patients who seek care 
from another provider whether that care is needed; and 3) increas-
ing the delivery of primary and secondary preventive care.
The second overarching goal of medical home programs is 
improving the quality of care by  maintaining comprehensive clini-
cal information on the care patients receive from other providers, 
providing a sounder basis for the medical home physician’s diag-
noses and treatment decisions.  In addition, use of evidence-based 
guidelines and registries can help medical homes ensure patients 
receive recommended care. Improved quality of care also may 
reduce health care costs by avoiding preventable hospitalizations, 
complications, medical errors and unnecessarily long episodes of 
care.
Coordinating care across providers is one critical way to reduce 
overuse of services. The medical home ideally will help patients use 
appropriate specialists and coordinate the testing and treatment 
that all providers deliver. But whether medical homes can achieve 
this goal depends on the behavior of patients and other provid-
ers—behavior that medical homes cannot completely control. 
Medical home physicians rely on patients to report plans to see 
other providers, including specialists. Without such knowledge, 
medical home physicians cannot make appropriate decisions to 
instead provide the care themselves, steer the patient to a high-
quality specialist or determine if another type of specialist would 
be more appropriate.
Unfortunately, there is a risk that patients may not share this 
information with the medical home. Fee-for-service payment sys-
tems provide few incentives, penalties or restrictions on patients’ 
use of other providers, and some patients may view efforts to 
coordinate with the medical home physician as restrictive and 
time-consuming.    
Specialists must in turn share information about their clinical 
findings, prescribed medications and care plan with the medical 
home, either directly or through the patient, so the medical home 
can ensure that the patient’s overall care is consistent and integrat-
ed.  But under neither fee-for-service nor current medical home 
models do specialists receive additional compensation or other 
incentives for communicating with the medical home or patients. 
While some might argue that existing standards of care and pay-
ment rates already include expectations for such communication, 
the reality is that it often does not occur.
Medical Home Information Exchange 
Effective information exchange between the medical home and the 
patient relies on an agreement between the medical home and the 
patient. Under such an agreement, patients agree to tell the medi-
cal home when they wish to see another primary care physician or 
specialist and why.  In return, the medical home agrees to oversee 
the entirety of patients’ care, including  advising patients whether 
or not to seek care from another practitioner. If patients are 
unwilling to share complete information on the care they receive, 
or wish to receive, from other providers, the medical home will 
not be able to comprehensively manage patient care.  Such a 
breakdown in the exchange of information between the medical 
home and patient would leave the patient’s care as fragmented and 
inefficient as under current fee-for-service arrangements.
The exchange of clinical information between the medical 
home and patients’ other providers—specialists, other primary 
care physicians, hospitals, post-acute care facilities, nursing 
homes—is equally essential to the medical home model. 
Patient Challenges
There are two major challenges to exchanging clinical informa-
tion between the medical home and patients.  The first is that 
many patients in fee-for-service systems may not want to put all 
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their information eggs in one medical home basket. Specifically, 
many patients, and especially many Medicare beneficiaries with 
chronic conditions, see many practitioners, including multiple 
primary care physicians. Some patients believe that doing so offers 
the advantages of multiple perspectives on the best treatment 
approach. These patients may not want to place all their trust in 
the hands of a single medical home provider in the belief that “two 
physician heads are better than one.”  
The second major challenge is that some patients may fear 
their medical homes will function as a gatekeeper to control access 
to other providers. While the medical home model tries to avoid 
the mandatory gatekeeper model used by some managed care 
organizations, medical homes are likely to have a “soft gatekeeper” 
function. One of the most important mechanisms for medical 
homes to achieve cost savings is for the medical home to identify 
potentially redundant tests and services before they occur and 
counsel patients to avoid redundant services. While some patients 
may dislike this oversight, others may simply not take the time to 
circle back and inform their medical home about care they plan to 
receive, or have received, elsewhere.    
Specialist Challenges
As challenging as the medical home-patient exchange of informa-
tion is, the medical home-specialist exchange may be more so. The 
primary challenge in exchanging information with other provid-
ers is that the number of other providers can be large. One study 
found that the typical primary care physician shares his or her 
Medicare patients with 229 other physicians working in 117 other 
practices.54 
In most communities, different physician practices operate 
autonomously of one another, with little integration in terms of 
common culture, administrative procedures, financing or infor-
mation systems. Many medical homes may find it practically 
infeasible to negotiate “service agreements” with all providers see-
ing their patients to lay out common expectations about how each 
party will share clinical information. Even if service agreements 
were negotiated with all other providers, many medical homes 
would find it infeasible to exchange information with all provid-
ers seeing all of the medical home’s patients. Without some form 
of electronic information exchange among providers beyond fax 
machines, implementing information flows among networks of 
this magnitude may not be practical for many practices.  
Second, medical homes cannot establish service agreements 
with every other provider because some of those encounters, such 
as those in emergency departments or during hospital admissions, 
cannot be easily anticipated. Thus, a related issue for coordinating 
care with outside providers is how to improve information flow 
so that medical homes know when their patients use emergency 
Medical home initiatives typically have two overarch-
ing goals—to reduce costs and improve the quality 
of care. Medical homes are expected to reduce costs 
directly by avoiding redundant or unneeded tests, 
imaging, procedures and medications.
departments or are hospitalized. With more complete information 
on incidental care encounters, medical homes would be better able 
to educate patients about potential alternatives for care, provide 
relevant clinical history to emergency and inpatient providers, 
assist in communicating with patients’ families, and help patients 
understand hospital discharge instructions and coordinate transi-
tional care.
Third, many specialists may not see the value of entering into 
service agreements with medical homes.  Specifically, payers typi-
cally pay a fee to the medical home that includes the time and 
equipment devoted to the information exchange, but specialists are 
not paid directly.  If the specialist is practicing in a geographic area 
containing many medical homes, the costs of exchanging informa-
tion on many patients with many medical homes may be substan-
tial.  In theory, the medical home could compensate specialists for 
the time and equipment used in the information exchange by shar-
ing medical home fees with specialists. Such an arrangement may 
require modification to law and regulation pertaining to provider 
fee-splitting. In practice, many sponsors of medical home initia-
tives do not include the full cost of exchanging information with 
other providers in medical home fees. In such instances, the medi-
cal home is unlikely to share fees with specialists.  
Overcoming the Challenges
Several approaches can mitigate the challenges of the medical 
home-patient information exchange. The first is to make the agree-
ment between the medical home and the patient as explicit and 
formal as possible. This means the agreement should be written, 
and the medical home should discuss the agreement with the 
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management providers in recent Medicare demonstrations. Such 
networks minimize the cost of setting information exchange agree-
ments with specialists, as well as minimize the transaction cost of 
exchanging clinical information. 
A second approach specific to ambulatory care physicians is for 
payers to require specialists to enter into service agreements with 
medical homes as a condition of inclusion in their plan network.  
Third, payers could leverage other financial incentives they may 
already be offering providers to use electronic information sys-
tems. For example, Medicare could combine the financial incen-
tives in its electronic health record (EHR) demonstration with the 
Medicare medical home demonstration. The combined incentive 
may encourage more practices to invest in EHR technology, which 
would in turn reduce the transaction cost of the information 
exchange. For this strategy to be effective, payers would have to 
require interoperable EHR systems.  
Fourth, payers could use claims data to provide feedback to the 
medical home on the patient’s health care from other providers.  
Information on hospital admissions, emergency room use and the 
need for preventive services would be particularly useful.  Clearly 
this strategy raises privacy concerns, but the agreement between 
the medical home and the patient could include the patient’s 
informed consent for the release of such information to the medi-
cal home.   
Fostering Care Delivery Changes
The medical home model can serve as an impetus for increasing  
primary care physicians’ responsibility and authority to coordinate 
the care of their patients, as well as foster greater patient self-man-
agement of medical conditions. Ultimately, piecemeal incentives 
will likely have limited ability to ensure effective coordination of 
care across multiple providers that remain unaffiliated and poorly 
integrated in their management, culture and financing. 
Policy makers might consider an improved medical home 
model as a bridge to broader reforms of the organization of 
delivery systems, in which they encourage the “virtual” networks 
defined by service agreements to gradually become actual net-
works of affiliated providers. Favorable payment systems that focus 
on provider organizations that are integrated can create incentives 
for medical practices—and health care markets—to evolve toward 
greater cohesion through enlarging existing practices, mergers 
among practices or practices and hospital systems, or other cre-
ative arrangements. The medical home model is unlikely to result 
in sustainable, meaningful improvements in care coordination and 
outcomes without confronting and addressing these underlying 
issues in the organization of care delivery.
patient, ideally in person. The agreement should describe the 
responsibilities of, and benefits to, the patient and the medical 
home. Patients agree to share information on all aspects of their 
care with the medical home provider and to consider the medical 
home physician’s advice seriously, even when it pertains to care 
provided by a different physician. In return, the medical home 
offers the patient better coordinated care and a more satisfactory 
patient experience. Both parties should sign the agreement.
A second approach is for the medical home program to 
exclude patients who are unwilling to enter into such an agree-
ment.  The medical home should attempt to persuade the patient 
to join the medical home program, but failing that, the medical 
home and program sponsors should recognize that the medical 
home model may not be well suited to all patients.  
Turning to the medical home-specialist information exchange, 
the less expensive it is to exchange a particular type of informa-
tion, the more feasible it will be for medical homes to exchange 
information with large numbers of specialists. One way to 
minimize the cost of information exchange is for medical home 
programs to focus on practices that already participate in a net-
work of providers, such as an integrated service delivery network 
(ISDN), health information exchange (HIE) or regional health 
information organization (RHIO).  For example, such networks 
can include information exchanges with local hospitals through 
electronic physician portals55 that can push information to the 
medical home practice when a patient is evaluated at a hospital. 
Such an approach was used successfully with several disease 
The medical home model can serve as an impetus 
for increasing primary care physicians’ responsi-
bility and authority to coordinate the care of their 
patients, as well as foster greater patient self-  
management of medical conditions. 
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The resurgence in interest among policy makers in the medical home 
concept stems from goals of improving quality and reducing health 
care costs. Another driver of recent advocacy for the model is the 
search for vehicles to increase financial support for primary care phy-
sicians, whose services are widely acknowledged to be undercompen-
sated in current fee-for-service payment systems. Moreover, existing 
fee-for-service payment systems typically do not pay for important 
activities that primary care physicians perform, such as care coordi-
nation and patient education. 
Paying for Medical Homes:      
A Calculated Risk
By Hoangmai H. Pham, Deborah Peikes               
and Paul B. Ginsburg
Partial Capitation Payment Dominates 
Medical Home Pilots and Demonstrations
Payment approaches for medical homes under current fee-for-service payment systems essentially focus on additional 
payment for currently uncovered services. But the signal challenge 
is that payers have limited data both on what these uncovered 
services are in current practice and what the ideal array of services 
should be—that is, services that dependably result in high-quality, 
efficient patient care.
Payers recognize that medical home services, such as care 
coordination, are difficult to itemize, may occur outside face-to-
face patient visits, and can legitimately vary in type and intensity 
across different patients or over time for a given patient. Paying 
for medical home services effectively requires some sort of capita-
tion, or fixed per-patient fees. Most payers sponsoring medical 
home demonstrations or pilots offer additional payment in the 
form of partial capitation—a single per-patient, per-month or per-
practice, per-year fee that is prospectively calculated. 
Across public- and private-sector medical home initiatives, it 
is also clear that payers are more focused on paying for the pro-
cesses that medical homes engage in than on the outcomes of those 
processes. Generally, if medical home initiatives incorporate any 
variation in payment levels, they tend to link payments to levels of 
medical-home capability. Frequently they do not consider patients’ 
disease burden or physicians’ performance on standardized qual-
ity measures. Although a few medical home initiatives—for exam-
ple, those sponsored by the state of Vermont and the Blue Cross 
Blue Shield Association—recommend incorporating bonuses tied 
to physicians’ performance on clinical quality or patient satisfac-
tion measures, most payers are taking a wait-and-see approach on 
bonuses. Even fewer payers are considering payment adjustments 
based on patients’ illness burden, a posture that makes it difficult 
to adapt payment levels from one program to another if the pro-
grams serve markedly different patient populations—for example, 
working-age, healthy commercially insured patients vs. sicker 
Medicare patients. One major exception is the Medicare medical 
home demonstration (MMHD), which will adjust payment rates 
based on illness severity.
The Constraint of Budget Neutrality
The most straightforward approach to setting capitated payments 
would be to first identify the services to be covered—those payers 
deem effective and currently not reimbursed—and then estimate 
their unit costs and frequency of delivery to the typical patient. 
Summing the product of unit costs and service frequency for a 
given time period would yield a per-capita amount, such as a 
monthly care management fee. However, calibrating even limited 
capitated payments proves a thorny endeavor, because payers cur-
rently place a high priority on budget neutrality. The hope is that 
potential savings from delivery of medical home services, such as 
reduced hospitalizations from improved care coordination, will 
offset any additional payments to physician practices for serving 
as medical homes.
But there is so little experience with medical homes that, as 
yet, there is no certainty that additional services will actually 
increase efficiency through lower costs and/or improved quality. 
This uncertainty makes it difficult to set payment levels that will 
achieve spending neutrality and to determine whether such levels 
will be sufficient to underwrite the costs of the activities that pay-
ers expect medical homes to perform. 
Setting payments is particularly challenging in the context of 
demonstrations and pilots. Physicians naturally are concerned 
about how they will fare financially in a program of limited dura-
tion. They have reason to worry about payers’ long-term com-
mitment to pay for medical-home capabilities and the amount of 
time practices would have to amortize costs incurred to become 
medical homes. And physicians’ perception of the adequacy of 
payments arguably carries more weight for medical home services 
than other services, because physicians have to be willing to par-
ticipate if payers are to establish and sustain this new model.
Lastly, not all patients need the same amount of care coordina-
tion and not all medical homes offer the same services—the “typi-
cal” unit of medical home care is more difficult to define than that 
of more discrete services, such as a colonoscopy. For example, one 
medical home practice might attempt to improve coordination by 
implementing electronic data exchange with other providers—a 
resource-intensive strategy—while another practice might opt 
instead to implement team meetings for particular patients—a 
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which to base the new fees. Payers can improvise hybrid approach-
es that try to balance all three objectives of accurately reflecting 
costs, budget neutrality and adequate physician participation.
In most currently planned public- and private-sector initiatives, 
the overriding priority is achieving budget neutrality for payers. 
For example, this is an explicit consideration in the multi-payer 
medical home pilot in Rhode Island. Payers base payment levels 
on estimates of the savings they might achieve—for example, from 
reduced use of emergency department services and redundant test-
ing. Payers would expect these savings to be offset by increases in 
other spending categories, such as preventive care. At the extreme, 
one private initiative has cautiously adopted a “pay-as-you-go” 
approach, by promising to share actual savings with physicians.  
Payers are not yet at the point where they are willing to add pay-
ment for currently nonreimbursed services without a reasonable 
chance that it will be offset by savings elsewhere. Yet, in the setting of 
pilots and demonstrations, payers are much better positioned than 
physicians to take risks and absorb potential losses from the experi-
ment. They could do so by reducing their focus on budget neutrality 
and relying more heavily on cost estimates of services and/or the 
level of incentive that will entice physicians to participate.
The Medicare medical home demonstration will actually 
attempt to price medical home services and reimburse physi-
cians based on costs, as estimated by the Relative Value Update 
Committee (RUC). In contrast, few private-sector initiatives are 
taking this bottom-up approach, which physicians may perceive as 
more scientifically sound and fair but which requires much more 
painstaking data collection than private payers have been willing 
to wait or pay for. One notable exception is the Vermont medical 
home pilot, which reviewed related public and private programs 
and consulted with physician organizations, other stakeholders and 
payment experts to assess costs of typical “transformation of care 
processes,” such as hiring part-time nurses. 
To anticipate how physicians might react to different payment 
levels, payers have to consider not only the costs of required med-
ical-home capabilities, but also the average proportion of practice 
revenues that eligible patients represent for a typical physician. 
Most medical home initiatives involve a single payer, with pay-
ments that would, therefore, represent a minority, although pos-
sibly a substantial one, of a physician’s revenues. This is true even 
for the MMHD (Medicare accounts for roughly 30% of a primary 
care physician’s revenues) and initiatives in communities with 
highly concentrated private payer markets. The revenue sources 
for a given practice are important to consider because physicians 
will judge proposed payment levels based on whether they are high 
enough to amortize investment costs and cover operating costs of 
new medical-home capabilities. Most initiatives do not explicitly 
The resurgence in interest among policy makers 
in the medical home concept stems from goals of 
improving quality and reducing health care costs. 
far less expensive strategy. Because most medical home initiatives 
allow physicians to choose different qualifying capabilities, fixed 
payment levels may not match the actual costs of a particular 
medical-home capability.
So physicians may expect payments to reflect differences both 
in disease burden and medical-home capabilities, adding layers of 
administrative complexity. Unfortunately, the lack of sound cost 
data to provide different medical home services to different types 
of patients leaves payers and physicians dependent on educated 
guesswork for setting cost-based prices.  
Given the complexity of setting medical home payment levels, 
it is no wonder that payment levels range as broadly as they do 
across different programs—from an expected $20,000 to $30,000 
per practice, per year in Vermont to $35,000 to $85,000 per full-
time physician per year in Philadelphia. Fees in the Medicare dem-
onstration could total $104,232 or $133,386 per year for the typical 
primary care physician.56
Calibrating Payments
Payers can employ three general methods to set the capitation pay-
ment. First, payment can reflect the costs of providing the extra 
services expected of a medical home, which requires estimating 
the costs of acquiring and maintaining medical-home capabili-
ties, such as disease management and “open-access” scheduling. 
Second, payers can set payments to be budget neutral. Payers 
would estimate the total they expect to spend for eligible patients, 
make assumptions regarding the savings that medical home ser-
vices might generate through more efficient delivery of care and 
set fees to equal those theoretical savings. Finally, payers can set 
payments to represent a target share of physician income to ensure 
adequate participation, which in turn requires estimating a phy-
sician’s current revenues and determining the percentage upon 
Center for Studying Health System Change Policy Perspective No. 1 • December 2008
17
cover investment costs, and the size of a physician’s patient panel 
is largely fixed. Therefore, physicians’ interest in participating may 
depend on whether they believe that payments exceed their likely 
operating costs by a large enough margin to offset their investment 
costs. Multi-payer initiatives would cover a larger percentage of a 
physician’s patient panel, dangling the promise of greater revenue 
gains to entice physicians to invest in practice improvements. 
With the many uncertainties in the cost and value of medi-
cal home services, there is a golden opportunity for payers and 
physician organizations to collect detailed information on how 
physician practices transform themselves to achieve medical-home 
capabilities and the associated costs of those changes. Such data 
could not only help inject scientific rigor into the correction of 
payment levels as programs evolve, but also could clarify the level 
of effort that patients with different disease burdens require of 
medical homes, help identify the medical-home capabilities that 
are most cost effective, and inform judgments about the long-term 
sustainability of the model.
Taking Reasonable Risks Ahead of Data
From a broader policy perspective, it is worth questioning whether 
the earnest efforts to accurately price medical home services are 
a useful first step to achieving lasting payment reform. If the risk 
to the primary care infrastructure of doing nothing is as grave as 
consensus suggests, then payers may need to take a comparable 
risk to address the problem. At the moment, payers have much 
greater capacity to assume risk than do physicians—both in terms 
of resources and their potential to influence the behavior of other 
providers. Moreover, physicians are far less likely to invest in trans-
forming their practices for pilots of limited duration than for an 
ongoing program with sustained political support. 
Broad and lasting reform involves many technical and political 
steps pursued over many years. Demonstrations and pilots may 
merely be the first step in reform. Physicians are trained to order 
diagnostic tests only when they expect the results to affect future 
decision making, and not just to gather information for its own 
sake, because of the inconvenience and potential risk of complica-
tions to patients and the expense involved. Similarly, payers might 
consider whether their commitment to paying for medical home 
services or increasing their financial support for primary care in 
other ways will wane if they discover that medical home initiatives 
do not save money.
If payers are committed to increasing support for primary care 
regardless of the outcomes of medical home pilots, then they could 
design payments that at best achieve budget neutrality or even 
result in spending increases. That is, budget neutrality may be an 
admirable long-term goal, but an unrealistic expectation at every 
The daunting constraints of already soaring health 
care spending imply that long-term improvements 
in primary care payment might need to occur in a 
zero-sum fashion involving shifts of resources from 
non-primary care services.
step of reform. Payers could implement such payments broadly—
for all primary care physicians who achieve medical-home capa-
bilities—rather than just in isolated initiatives. Then they could 
track physician performance and patient outcomes and adjust the 
program as needed over time. Precedents for this more aggressive 
approach include some of the most dramatic changes to Medicare 
payment policy—establishment of the Medicare inpatient pro-
spective payment system and the resource-based relative value 
scale for physician services.
Medical Homes as a Stepping Stone to 
Broader Payment Reform
In the long term, medical home payment approaches could serve 
as a model for transitioning payment for care of chronic con-
ditions from fee for service to capitation as much as possible. 
Coupling capitation with bonuses based on system cost savings 
and quality outcomes would better align incentives for preventive 
care, coordination and quality improvement.57, 58
The daunting constraints of already soaring health care spend-
ing imply that long-term improvements in primary care payment 
might need to occur in a zero-sum fashion involving shifts of 
resources from non-primary care services. Payers can influence 
the degree to which this shift is gradual and acceptable to special-
ists. Paying for medical home services without immediate expecta-
tions of budget neutrality might begin to correct the imperfections 
of the fee-for-service system in a way that would minimize oppo-
sition from non-primary care providers, bettering the chances of 
broad reform stepping ahead.
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